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1THE ORIGIN OF THE FIRST DUTCH WAR OF THE RESTORATION
Introduction
The study of the conditions and forces which led up to the
First Dutch War of the Restoration 1665-7, seems to have been
neglected by historical writers and, so far as I know, no satis-
factory account of the origin of the war has been written.
Lister"^ has devoted some space to the subject, basing his
account principally on the letters of Clarendon, Do)-vning, and
D'Estrades. As he did not have access to the Dutch Records, he
failed to see the question from the Dutch point of view and v/as
ignorant of some facts which could be learned only from that
source. His general attitude toward the Dutch was somewhat in-
fluenced by Downing 's letters, although he believed Downing and
the Duke of York were the chief promoters of the war. He believed
that the ostensible unsettled grounds of dispute were trifling,
but that "private interests and private pique, the malign influ-
ence of powerful individuals concurring in the direction of pop-
ular feeling" prevented a settlement between the two countries.
2
Von Ranke believed the war was a great national movement,
desired by the nation and undertaken from both political and mer-
chantile motives; that it was an attack on the Dutch government,
whose position depended on its Anti-Orange and aggressive Protes-
tant attitude as well as an attack on the Dutch commercial monop-
1 Lister's Clarendon II., 240-269.
2 Von Rankers History of England III., 417-26.

2oly. He believed that Charles was at one v/ith Parliament and the
nation; also, that one of the chief objects of the war was the
restoration of the Prince of Orange. Von Ranke believed the
Dutch also were eager for war, and spoke of the obstinacy of De-
Witt in the negotiations for a settlement, as he hoped that the
war against the uncle of the Prince of Orange v/ould draw popular
hatred upon the Prince himself.
Airy^ believed the chief causes for the war were commercial
rivalry and the irritation among the Dutch caused by the condi-
tions of the Peace of 1654, aggravated by the re-enactment of the
Navigation Act; also that the private interests of Charles were
an important factor.
2Lavisse devoted only a paragraph to the subject, but be-
lieved that the v/ar was favored, in fact, urged on by the English
nation
.
3Gardiner
,
the greatest English historian, believed the hos-
tility of the two nations was due to commercial rivalry, which was
increased by the refusal of the Dutch to deliver Pularoon to Eng-
land according to treaty of 1654. He, also, mentioned Charleses
personal ill-will against the Dutch because of the exclusion of the
Prince of Orange from power.
These writers are about the only ones who discussed, the ori-
gin and causes of the war, while the last three devoted only a
1 few lines to it. These writers represent several nationalities
and probably had access to different sources. While each present-
ed his own ideas, which differ in some respects, they are unani-
1 Airy's Burnett's History of My Own Times I., 389,
2 Lavisse et Rambaud Histoire Generale VI.
3 Gardiner's Student's History of England, 589.

3mous (with the exception of Airy and Gardiner who oay nothing
about it) in the belief that the war v/as popular in England, while
von Ranke believed it popultj* with Holland, A study of English
and Dutch records will not substantiate this statement.
P/J?T I.
PERIOD OP THE COMT^TOlvHWEALTH AND PROTECTORATE
The English Dutch War of 1655-7 was the first war v/hich Eng-
land waged from motives predominately commercial. She now became
an aggressive candidate for a share in the world's commerce, which
had been practically monopolized by the Dutch for more than half
a century. After the destruction of the Spanish Armada, England
was too much occupied with internal problems of Church and State
to take advantage of her victory, and the supremacy of the sea
fell to Holland, During the first half of the seventeenth cen-
tury, the Dutch were leaders in trade and commercial enterprises,
and had the carrying trade of the v/orld. With the control of the
seas and at war v/ith Spain and Portugal, Holland gained colonial
possessions and trading posts in all parts of the world, Africa,
India, the East and West Indies, and the Americas, They conflict-
ed with the English in the East Indies, which ended in the ex-
pulsion of the English in the massacre of Amboyna, 1623. In North
America, they established a colony on the Hudson, although this
territory was claimed by the English, who strongly resented this
intrusion into their territory. Thus, by the middle of the seven-
teenth century, Holland v/as primarily a commercial country, ruled
by men whose primary interests were trade. Her ships were to be
seen on all seas, and she was growing wealthy from her colonial

4possessions and carrying trade.
The English merchants had made a few tradinifr expeditions to
the African coast durin/r the first half of the seventeenth century
"but, as they were unprotected by an Enplish fleet, their losses
from the attacks of Portup;uese"^ and Dutch were discourap^inp; to fur-
ther attempts. An Enrrlish factory was established on the African
2
coast in 1632, but was soon captured by the Dutch, v/ho controll-
ed a lar/3;e part of the coast. By 1651, the En^^lish possessed tv/o
3
factories, Cormantin and one near Sierra Leone, and had invested
4
about seventy thousand pounds for trade on that coast. England,
also, had valuable possessions in India, the West Indies and North
America, but had been so engrossed in internal affairs that she
had given little attention to these possessions.
In 1651, England's ambassadors returned from Holland, indig-
nant over their reqeption a.nd the refusal of the Dutch government
to accept their proposition for a treaty. Soon after their re-
turn England pasj-ed the Navigation Act of 1651. This act pro-
vided that no goods or commodities from. Asia, Africa, or America,
should be brought into any part of the English dominions, after
December 1, 1651, except in English ships, whereof the master and
most of the mariners were English; or in ships belonging to the
people of the nation in which the goods were grown or produced.
Salt-fish was also to be im.ported into or exported out of England
5
only in English ships.
1 Calendar of State Papers Colonial 1574-60, 20.
2 Ibid, 383.
3 Ibid, 355.
4 Ibid, 1574-60, 5 67.
5 Scobell's Ordinances, II., 176.

5This act, if carried out, must obviously have a most disas-
trous effect on the trade of the Dutch who were dependent on the
carrying" trade of ot'T^r nations for a 1 arp-e na.rt of f-^flr v/ealth.
The profitable trade in slaves and o'oner coin' odi ties ./ith the
Enfrlish West Indies would he annihilated, and the p;ains of the
]>utch fisherman le/rally ended as far as the Enfrllsh market v;as
concerned. En<^l&nd furt'ier complicated the matter l:y isyuin^;
grants of reprisal as;ainst the T'rench, then seizing" Ibutch ships
and depriving them of their French cargoes. Thus, the Dutch
trade v/ith both the French and English received a heavy blov/.
^Hiile there is no doubt the lav/ was often e^^aded, the seiz-
ure of Dutch ships and their car/roes, and the refusal of the Enp--
lish jTOverrjnent to negotiate with the Dutch embassy, created such
a tension of feeling that only a slight provocation was necessary
to bring about an open rupture. This occurred in the encounter
of Trom.p and Blake off the ccapt of England, which issued into
the v/ar of 1652-54. The English-Dutch hostility was fought out
not only in Enp-lish waters, but on the High Fleas wherever the in-
1 2
terests of the two conflicted; in the "Baltic, West Indies, on
3
the Atlantic and Mediterranean. A battle v/as fought between the
En"lish and Dutch fleets, which v;ere stationed in the Mediterran-
ean for the protection of trade. The English lost a ship and were
finally blocked up in two ports by. the Dutch fleet. Aggressive
preparations were made on both sides for the possession of the
2
i
African coast.
1 Calendar of Rtate "Papers, "nom-estic 1651-2, 425.
2 Ibid, 374.
3 Ibid, 391-3.

I6
After two years of rather indeciaive warfare a Treaty of
Peace wao drawn up in April, 1654. By this treaty, friendship
and peace were estalDlished "between tne two nations. Neither coun-
try was to give aid to enemies or rebels of the other, "but to use
all power against them. Dutch ships must dip their flags to the
English on British Seas. The States promised in a secret article
that the Prince of Orange should not be elevated to the position
of Stadtholder or Captain General. A board of arbitration, com-
, posed of an equal number of men from each nation, settled the
questions in dispute. The English were adjudged Pularoon. 85,
OOOiwere to be paid to the English East India Company and 3,615^
to the descendants of the victims of Amboyna. Just recompense
was to be made to the English who had lost ships and property in
Danish waters. Equitable compensation was also adjudged the Dutch
for losses in the East Indies and in European and Indian waters,^
The hostility toward the English was none the less bitter
and in the war which Cromv/ell waged against the Spanish in 1657-8,
2
Dutch ships were frequently found carrying Spanish goods or
3
Spanish soldiers. Although the policy of the Dutch seems to have
4
been outward respect and civility to the English ships, open con-
flicts sometimes occurred. An English merchant ship trading in
the Mediterranean in 1658, met a combined fleet of Spanish and
Dutch men-of-war, and was attaclced, burnt, and sunk by one of the
Dutch ships on which were many Spanish mariners. Many of the
1 Dumont*s Corps Diplomatique XII., 422.
2 Calendar of State Papers .Domestic 1657-8, 135.
3 Historical Mss. Commission V., 164,
4 Calendar of State Papers , Domestic 1657-8, 144.

English sailors were killed and the rt^st taken prisoners'!"
The evasion of the Navigation Acts by the Dutch, also, kept
alive the English-Dutch hostility. Although frequent reports were
2
made of the seizure of Dutch ships in the West Indies, the mer-
chants of St, Christopher complained that the Dutch had "been al-
lowed to engross the trade of the island to the disc ourageiriGnt of
3
the English, The commanders of ships in and about London com-
plained that the Navigation Act had been so eluded through various
devices, that their trade was chiefly carried on by alien and for-
eign built ships, so that many English ships were laid aside and
4
English seamen sought foreign employment (1658). In a petition
to the Protector the merchants said, "the Dutch eat us out of our
trade at home and abroad; they refuse to sell us a hogshead of
water to refresh us at sea and call us 'English dogs* (which doth
much grieve our English spirits). They will not sail with us, but
shoot at us and, by indirect courses, bring their goods into our
4
ports," The Customs Commissioners, to whom this petition was re-
ferred, admitted that Hollanders and other foreigners, under color
of English bills of sale, had lately carried on most of the Europ-
ean trade with this nation, but that it was very difficult to ob-
5
tain evidence to lead to conviction,
1 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1658-9, 122.
2 Ibid, 1656-7, 451.
3 Ibid, 1658-9, 473.
4 Ibid, 7.
5 Ibid, 1658-9, 8.

8PART II.
PRIHIOD OF THK RESTOIUTIQN
CliAPTJ^lR I.
FOREIGN AND C OIEIERC lAL POLICY OF THE RESTORATION
So matters stood /hen in May 1660, Charles II. was restored
to the throne of England. The new regime soon announced its com-
mercial policy in the Navigation Act of 1660. This act confirmed
and further developed the Act of '52 by more prohibitive and
stringent measures, and was an open avov/al of hostility to the
leader of trade and commerce, Holland. Charles recognized the
value of the commercial policy of the Protectorate and its popu-
larity with the Londoners, whose interests were largely commerci-
al. By adopting a policy which was favored by London, the center
of power in England, Charles was strengthening his ov/n position.
This act^ provided that no goods or commodities whatsoever
should be imported into or exported out of any part of English
possessions except in English ships, whereof three fourths of the
mariners were English. Goods of foreign growth or manufacture
were to be imported only from the places of their growth, produc-
tion or manufacture or from ports where they could only or usual-
ly had been shipped. After February 1, no alien could exercise
the occupation of merchant or factor in any of the English domin-
ions or possessions. After April 1, all sugar, tobacco, cotton,
wool, indigo, ginger and fustic from any of the English planta-
tions must be shipped only to English dominions and laid on shore.
All ships sailing from England, Ireland,and Wales, to the English
plantations must bring their goods there loaded into England. The
1 Statutes of the Realm V., 246.

9violation of any of these measures was to result in confiscation.
As England now openly aflsumed a position of age^'esai've hos-
tility to the Dutch, the relations between the two countries "be-
came more strained. Holland had been supreme on the sea and car-
ried the world's trade for more than half a century. As her
colonial possessions and wealth, even her existence, depended on
maintaining the control of the sea, she guarded it with all her
strength. England had settled in the Puritan Revolution, the
problems of Church and State which had occupied her attention so
long and now sought a share in the world's trade and coraiaerce.
Her commercial interests and opposition to the Dutch brought about
the adoption of a definite commercial policy, "by which she would
monopolize all trade into or out of any part of her dominions. As
this legislation, if enforced, would make serious inroads into the
trade so long enjoyed by the Dutch, it is not surprising that they
not only disregarded but resisted it, and especially when encour-
aged by the English colonies.
Charles appreciated the value of the African trade and the
necessity of supplying the plantations in the West Indies with
slaves. He soon took under consideration means by which this
trade could be secured to the English. On December 18, 1660, he
granted to James, Duke of York and Lord High Admiral, the regions
of Guinea, Binney, Angola and South Barbary, stretching from Cape
Blanco to Cape of Good Hope, for the sole use and trade of the
Company of Royal Adventures in Africa, which was on this date in-
corporated^* The interests of the English and Dutch traders on the
1 Calendar of State Papers , Colonial 1661-8, § 408.

10
African coast soon conflicted and Sir Robert Holraes'J who had
served in the Protestant Revolution in the squadron of Prince Ru-
pert, was sent out to the Guinea coast by the Duke for the pro-
tection of the trade of the company. Holmes aggressively inter-
fered in the Dutch trade on the African coast, seizing Fort St.
Andrew which was then held by the Dutch, and greatly hindering
2
"the freedom of trade they had long enjoyed". The cause for
Holmes' s aggressive attitude does not seem clear. It may have
been in retaliation for the seizure of the English fort years be-
fore, or for the resistance of the Dutch to English merchants who
attempted to trade on the African coast.
The Dutch bitterly opposed these English interlopers (as th^
regarded them) in the territory which they had won from the Portu-
3
guese by conquest and treaty. The English quite probably desired
4
to trade peaceably on the African coast and there was no apparent
reason why the two could not trade in this long stretch of terri-
tory without coming into conflict. The national antagonism of the
two peoples and the stubborn resistance of the Dutch to any en-
croacliment on their commercial rights made this impossible. The
Dutch protested to the English government against Holmes's actions
on the African coast. The King of England disclaimed the pro-
ceedings of Captain Holmes, but promised to look into the matter
and order that from henceforth nothing should be done to the prej-
udice of the West India Company? Nevertheless, conflicts contin-
1 Dictionary of National Biography XXVII, 194.
2 Calendar of State Papers .Colonial 1661-3, § 177.
3 Ibid, § 467.
4 Lister's Clarendon lit, 256,

ued on the African coast and the Royal African Company, in opite
of p;rants of ships and money from the state, did not prosper, and
was unahle to supply the plantations with the necessary slaves.
Complaints were made of the Governor of Jamaica, who received in
the harhor a "^utch ship laden with neproes, which he houfrht con-
trary to the T'avip;ation .«ct and wishes of the Council hecause
2they were much needed. '^he Enr^lish attempted to monopolize all
T'^nglish and colonial shipping? hut found themselves unable to Tieet
the demands made upon them, and to compete with Holland with her
great fleets, skilled seamen, and superior tradinr? capacity. The
English merchants and seamen were unable to supply the needs of
the mother country and her colonies, yet refused to allow the
^utch a share in this trade. A-s a result, there war distress in
many parts of En^^land's dominions, and complaints of a sudden de-
cay in trade came from all directions.
The King's attention was soon occupied with the complicated
foreign and international matters into which he was drav/n. Por-
tugal had been struggling for several decades agal nst the aggres-
sions of the Dutch in her scattered colonial possessions, and was
gradually losing one after another, which deprived her of her m.ain
source of revenue. 5^he was also threatened by Spain and turned to
England for an alliance. This plan presented several strong in-
ducem.ents to Charles. It offered an advancement for trade, an en-
largem.ent of dominions, and an opportunity to check the conquests
3 ^
of the Dutch, who had secured control of Ceylon, Coa in India,
1 Calendar of State :°apers Colonial, 1661-8, ^ 205.
2 Ibid, 106.
3 Lister's Clarendon III., 112.
4 Historical ^^ss. Comjnission v., 151.

12
and "possosaions of much greater value than all Brazil.""^ As such
an alliance might involve England in a war with Spain u.nd Holl.'md,
Charles sought to eliminate some of the disadvantages before com-
mitting himself. He sent word to the Dutch, asking that he might
mediate "between the two countries. His aggressive championship of
Portugal checked for a time, the Dutch aggressions on Portuguese
trade.
The alliance between England and Portugal sealed "by the mar-
riage of Charles II. and the Portuguese princess, Catherine, was
2
strongly opposed by the Dutch and Spanish, A treaty was finally
drawn up by which Charles was to receive Tangiers, Bombay, and the
3
sum of two million Portuguese crowns as a wedding dower, vAiile he
was to send troops to Portugal to assist in the war against Spain.
In May, the Dutch and Portuguese consented to refer their
4
business to the King of England as umpire, and negotiations for a
treaty were begun in The Hague. Sir George Downing, an able but
5
proud, insolent, and unscrupulous man v;as sent over as Ambassador
5
to Tie Hague in June, 1661. He found the two powers dispatching
their business with extraordinary haste, probably to settle the
matter before his arrival. He said "had I stayed two days longer,
6
it had been dispatched before my coming". Downing soon intimi-
dated the Portuguese ambassador with threats that if he did any
thing without the consent of England, the treaty would be disal-
6
lowed by his home government and the negotiations between
1 Lister's Clarendon III, 153.
2 Historical Mss. Commission, V. , 158.
3 Historical Mss, Commission, Heathcote , 30.
4 Historical Mss, Commission, V, , 170.
5 Lister's Clarendon III,, 134 n.
6 Ibid, 134.

13
England and Portugal "broken off,^ In this way, Dovvnin^^ secured
almost complete control over him and postponed the settlement until
the following year.
Downing objected to two provisions in the Portuguese-Dutch
2
treaty. The Dutch were given the right of preemption in obtain-
ing from Portugal all their salt. They were also promised all
commercial and trading rights which the English or any other na-
2
tion enjoyed in any of the Portuguese possessions. "It is past
all doubt", Downing wrote to Clarendon, "that any privilege which
the English shall have in common with the Dutch would be of little
3
benefit to the English for the Dutch would out- trade them". He
based his remonstrance on the claim that it was contrary to the
treaty between Cromwell and Portugal, which gave England the mon-
4
opoly of Portuguese trade". Downing 's interference and aggres-
sive insolence were resented by the Dutch, but their resentment
was greatly increased when he attempted to replace the treaty by
various substitutes whic>i would frustrate or check, as would a
treaty of peace, their conquests in the Portuguese dominions, and
yet secure them none of the trade concessions of the proposed
treaty.
Clarendon began to fear the Dutch might declare war on the
Portuguese, which would also involve England, and as time v;ent on
he urged more and more insistently that Downing should adopt a
5
more conciliatory policy. He was not sure but that the Portuguese
could grant the Dutch equal commercial privileges v/ithout violat-
1 Lister's Clarendon III, 137.
2 Ibid 157.
3 Ibid 147.
4 Ibid 23".
5 Ibid 157 & 162.

14
ing the treaty, "but "believed they should make some other recom-
pense to the English. ^ 'Finally he advised that the Portugese am-
hassador should he allowed to si'-^n the treaty if the "Dutch were
determined upon it. T">Te8e pacific instructions v«rere unwelcome
to Downinf'; and he ne,s;lected to execute them. Clarendon was
forced to reprimand him and impress on him the necessity of pre-
2
ventinp; a war. Downinp- v/as an unfortunate representative of the
English e;overnment, for instead of conciliating the "outch, he
only alienated them "by his intrigues, suspicions, and uncomprom-
ising attitude.
Other matters, ctlso, m.ade the relations between the English
and Putch more strained and it was difficult for Tie Witt and
Downin*:, each distrustful of the other, to best further the in-
terests of his ov;n country. Holland, especially Rotterdam, was
the refuge and meeting place of the religious fanatics, who were
forced to flee from England and here they plotted against the
English government. The En/rlish spies frequently wrote "back to
England that these fanatics were receiving aid and encouragement
3 4
from, the people of Holland and even mentioned T)e Witt as impli-
cated in their plans. '.'nn.ether there was any truth in these charges
or not, they increased the tension and hostility "betv/een the two
nations.
Charles's personal antipathy to the Dutch was pro"bably in-
creased by their ridicule and personal attacks on his life and
5
character.
1 Lister's Clarendon TIT., 175.
2 Ibid, 189.
3 Calendar of Ptate Papers, "Pomestic 1663-4, 405.
4 Ibid 1664-5, 140.
5 Pepys II. , 68.

When Charles first carie to the throne of England, lie showed
a good deal of interest in placing his nephew, Prince of Orange,
in power in Holland. He sought the aid of France, who expressed
a willingness to assist him, "but probably had no intention of do-
ing so. Fnen Charles became more insistent, D'Estrades, French
Ambassador in London, said the prince was too young now (being but
ten years of age) but \rhen the time cajne, the King of France
would gladly co-cperate in his behalf.^ Downing recommended that
a provision in favor of the Prince should be included in the
treaty with the Dutch, as they "would not hazard their trade upon
2
that point only", but Clarendon refused to consider this. This
question soon dropped into the back ground as more important and
urgent questions engrossed the minds of Englishmen.
The mutual enmity of the two states v/as fostered by Louis
XIV. through D'Estrades, "for", said he, "as long as they live in
mutual jealousy and dissatisfaction, I shall be of more importance
3
to each." Clarendon, however, was anxious to bring about peace
between the two nations, for England needed peace at home and
abroad until the new government v/as placed on a firm footing.
Largely through his influence, a treaty of peace was drawn up be-
4tween England and Holland, September 14, 1662.
This treaty provided for peace and friendship between the two
countries, who were to aid each other against any enemies or re-
bellious subjects by land or sea. The King and States-General or
their subjects were to do nothing contrary to the interests of the
1 Lister *s Clarendon II., 241.
2 Lister's Clarendon III., 143.
3 D'Estrades I., 158 (Lister's Clarendon II, , 244).
4 Dumont's Corps Diplomatique XII., 422,
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other, nor would they aid, favor, or harhor fugitive rebels. Thery^
were to have freedom of trade and access to each others ports in
Europe. The treaty and friendship were not to be dissolved by
the aggression or breach of faith of the subjects of either na-
tion, but such should be punished and full justice rendered, with-
in a year if coomitted on this side of the Straits and Cape of
Good Hope, in eighteen montlis, if beyond. Pularoon was to be re-
stored to the English. All actions and claiins for daraages commit-
ted in India before January 10, 1659 were to cease (with the ex-
ception of the case of the Bona Aventura and Esperanza which was
to be continued as already begun). In all other parts of the
world, those cases which had arisen before March 4, 1654, were to
be ended. All cases which had arisen after these dates were to
be submitted for settlement to commissioners appointed by each na-
tion.
The cession of Tangiers by the Portuguese had given England
an added interest in the Mediterranean and during these first fev/
years of the Restoration, she laid the foundation for her control
over this sea. In 1660, a royal fleet was sent out under the
2
Earl of Sandwich to protect English trade in the Mediterranean
against the Algiers pirates. The Dutch virere Tery suspicious and
3
fearful of Sandwich's motives and also prepared a fleet for the
4Mediterranean under Tromp. In 1661 England and Holland, in spite
of their strained relations, joined in an enterprise against these
pirates. Each sent out from twenty to thirty men of war to the
1 Dumont's Corps Diplomatique XII., 422,
2 Lister's Clarencion III., 156.
3 Ibid 139-144.
4 Historical Mss, Commission V,, 170,
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1
Fedi terranean. The two fleets, mutually j o;i l oi.is , f^uv. Ve-nt v/atch
over each other, England increased the tension oy inaiatinrr that
Portup-al should not admit Holland to the same tradlnr^ prlvilep-es
2
as bersell", hecause of her hi 1 lance with Portu^cral.
Sandwich \ms unahle to faiu control of Tanfriers until Ja.rma.ry
1662, when the Portufruese governor of the fort was forced to call
on him for aid ap-ainst the Moors. January 12, Sandwich secured
3
the coveted port and Enn;land gained her first foothold in the
Mediterranean. In the fall of 16^2, !^ir John Lawson arrived in
the Mediterranean just in time to prevent its heing hlocked up hy
4
Spain in league with Gruylan, leader of the I'oors, and with Holland.
All three resented England's entrance into Mediterranean affairs.
The Spanish denied the English pratique at all their ports, "but
5granted it to the Itutcii with a good deal of ostentation. Never-
theless, Lawson had concluded a peace with Algiers, Tripoli, and
Tunis, hv the end of the year.°
In the meantime the Royal African Company had not proved a
financial success. The Dutch considered the African coast, es-
pecially Guinea, as their own through conquest and prior occupa-
tion. They took an aggressive stand against all English traders
in this region, and used various means and suhterfuges to secure
their end. They frequently declared the harhors of important
trading posts closed, on the ground that the;/ were at v/ar with the
natives for insubordination or destruction of Dutch property, and
hence could not allow trade with these natives
1 Historical Mss. Commission V. , 160.
2 Ibid, 19.
3 CorT-ett, England in the T'editerranean II., 30.
4 Historical Mss. Comuiission, Heath'" ote . 39.
5 Ibid, 150 and 165.
6 Ikid, 51.
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until they hud made reparation and submission. "hen I'.nplish
traders tried to "break the eiege (sometiTnes maintained hy the
presence of warships, sornetimes merely a paper "blockade), their
ships were seized or fired upon, althoun-h In some of these ports
the Fnpillsh as well as the ^^utch owned lod^7;es or tradlnr posts.
Tt was seen that unless the Kinp- established the company on a
firmer basis with a larger stock and stronger frovernment , the
Fngllsh would be driven out of the African trade. "Petitions came
In from tlie planters of the West Indies complaining that if the
Company did not supply therr, with the necessary negro servants,
"the plantations -vill either be useless or they must take their
slaves from the "'^utch, which v/ill utterly divert English shipping
2
from these parts." Thus, the profit of the trade in negroes and
African commodities, the development of the plantations, and the
antipathy to the Dutch led to the reorganization of the Poyal Af-
rican Com.pany.
January 18, 1663, the Royal African Company was reorganized,
the debts of the old company paid and a new management formed with
a joint stock of one hundred twenty thousand pounds, "for the
furtherance of trade and encouragement in the discovery of golden
3
mines and settling of plantations". The government of the company
was vested in a Court of Assistants, consisting of the Governor,
"^eputy rrcvernor and seven assistants, who had the m.anap-ement of
all the affairs of the company. The company was granted the ex-
clusive trading privileges (1. e. , excluding all other "English
traders) in the territory from "Port "^allee in "^outh }?arbary to the
1 Calendar of ^tate Papers , Colonial 1661-8, ^ 383.
Lister's Clarendon ITT., 279.
3 Ibid, 902.
4 Ibid. 408.
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Cape of Good Hope, vM power to r ortf j ocat f ^^-^^ f.'^-^-r^r. .'i>^«^ rar/^oes
of those Infrlnrlnp: on t^elr rip'hts.'^ ^''oet of the p;rantee8 of the
new oharter were eireat nobles and powerful state officials, amonr
whom were the Duke of York as f^iovernor, the Oueen ami v.-^rious re-
latives of the Kinr, Prince Hupert, j arl of F'andv/ich, ^"^uckingham,
1
yir j\ichard Ford, Sir i.Micholas Grispe and others. V/hile the com-
pany was not exactly a state enterprise, nost of the p-rantees were
men of hip-h position, who could use their influence to maVe it a
2 3
profitable enterprise. The Kins', Oueen, and Duke of York held
a large number of shares in the company and were personally inter-
ested in its success.
The Royal African Company began to prosper under the new
management and during the year of 1663 employed more than forty
ships and established about eighteen forts and factories on the
4
African coast. The whole trade, if unmolested, would yield as
5great a profit as any managed by English traders. The King gave
aid and encouragement to the Company by loaning them royal ships
6
and showing them special favor in various ways. This grant, how-
ever, included territory and trading posts in which the "nutch
claimed the exclusive right to trade. The development of a laree
and active trade in this region on the part of the English was
certain to result in trouble betv/een the two nations and was a
step toward the conflict between England and Holland for cominer-
cial supremacy.
1 Calendar of ntate Papers , Colonial 1661-8, ^ 408.
2 Calendar of ^tate Papers, Domestic 16^3-4, 184.
3 Ibid 1664-5, 7.
4 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-8, ^ 903.
5 Ibid, 5 554.
6 Calendar of Rtate Papers, Domestic 1663-4, ^ 389, 250, 314.
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CHAPTER II.
.•D.eVELOPJIENT OP THE WAR POLICY IN ENGLAND
In the summer of 1663, the mutual enmity of the Dutch and
English found expression in actual warfare on the African coast.
The Dutch resented this interference in their trade and determined
to maintain their rij^hts "by force.^ When their protests and
blockades were disregarded by the English, they follov/ed their
ships from port to port and prevented them from landing. They in-
cited the natives against them, seized their boats, goods, etc.
They blocked the ports of Cape Corso and Commenda with warships,
altho\igh the English held trading posts there. At Cape Corso,
which was one of the most important trade centers, the English and
Danes each had a trading post. The Dutch gained possession of
2
the Danish fort, and, as it was impossible for the two peoples to
trade in the same ports, conflicts soon arose. The Dutch attacked
Cormantin Castle, which the English had ovmed since 1651 and it
was only saved by the timely arrival of Captain Stoakes, head of
3
the English forces in Africa.
Valchenburg, Director General of the Dutch forces on the Af-
rican coast, issued protests on behalf of the States General and
West India Company, making it an affair of state as well as of
the company. He complained that the Royal African Company was
disturbing the Dutch in their lawful possessions which undisputa-
4
bly belonged to them (June, 1663). The English considered the
1 Calendar of State Papers .Colonial 1661-8, § 618 & 383.
2 Lister's Clarendon III., 364.
3 Calendar of State Papers , Colonial 1661-8, § 507.
4 Ibid, § 553.
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rights which had been granted them in the charter of 1663 equally
Infringed on, and instructed Dovming to demand full satisfaction
from the States General."^ The conflicts between English and Dutch
traders, came in time to be grievances of state and greatly in-
creased the national antagonism.
Downing had little sympathy with this method of trying to
settle the differences between the two trading companies. He said,
"this trick (of closing up harbors on pretense of war with the
natives) has not only been the ruin of numbers of the King's sub-
jects, but beaten them out of many mighty trades and will certain-
ly in conclusion utterly overthrov/ the English East India and Af-
rican Company if nothing be applied for remedy but 'words'. There
is nothing makes them here so proud as to have the English come
hither eternally with complaints, while their people are unmolested
and advance their trade. Better make no complaints at all, than
complain and have nothing follow. This is not the means to hinder
a war, but bring it on, by making them so far to presume to add
one injury to another. Pay them in their own kind and set their
subjects crying as well as his Majesty's and you will have a very
fair correspondence, and his Majesty will be as much honored as he
has been despised, for they love or honor none but them they think
2
can and dare bite them." In this way, he increased the antagon-
ism between the two countries when a conciliatory attitude might
have settled the points at issue in a peaceable manner.
The news of the refusal of the Dutch East India Company to
deliver the island of Pularoon added to the hostility of the Eng-
1 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-3, § 545.
2 Lister's Clarendon III., 249.
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lish. This island had been awarded to them in the Treaty of 1654
and the necessary documents and despatches for taking possession
of the island had been sent to England by the Dutch government.
The East India Company neglected to take possession during the
Protectorate and, after the Restoration, they again desired new
documents for its delivery. Their request was granted on the con-
dition that the King would assure the Dutch "by proper act that the
terms of the treaty with Cromwell would "be observed, but until
such provision was made, the Dutch refused to restore the island.
This was provided for in the Treaty of 1662, and the Dutch then
1
sent orders to England for its delivery. De Witt claimed that
the Dutch East India Company and their seinrants had always been
ready, since the treaty, to deliver the island,''' The Dutch gov-
ernor in Pularoon, however, refused to deliver the island to the
representatives of the English East India Company, who were sent
"2
out to take possession.
News, also, reached London in the fall of 1663 that the Dutch
had seized two English ships in India, the Hopev/ell and the Leop-
3
ard, which was a royal flagship. The Dutch justified their act-
ion on the ground that these ships were bound for ports which had
submitted to Dutch control and were closed to the trade of others.
The question of the five ships (the Hopewell and Leopard, taken
in Indian waters, the Charles, James, and Mary, seized on the Af-
rican coast) and of the two ships (the Bona Aventura and Esperanza)
were grievances for which England demanded restitution in the nego-
tiations for a settlement between the two nations,
1 Brieven de J. De Witt, 412-3.
2 Lister's Clarendon IIC, 256.
3 Fold 292-8.
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The Bona Aventura and Esperanza dispute was a heritaj^e of
the Commonwealth and Protectorate. These ships had "been seized
by the Dutch in 1643, while on a trading voyage to India. Pindar,
to whom they had been assigned by the original ovmers , sued the
Dutch East India Company for damages before the Court at Amsterdam
(1645), While the case was before the court, Courten, the heir of
the original owner, compromised with the company, not withstanding
the assignment, and indemnified the company against other claim-
eints. On Pindar *s death, his executor brought his claims before
the English and Dutch Commissioners, v\^o were appointed in 1654 to
arbitrate questions of dispute. The commissioners were unable to
settle the question within the three months required by the treaty,
and it was referred to the Swiss cantons. In 1662 the
question was still unsettled and the treaty of that year provided
that the case should be continued as already begun. Certain le-
gal technicalities and the proper interpretation of the clause in
the treaty which referred to the question were matters of dispute
and so the case was prolonged.
In 1663 the English found their commercial ventures on the
African Coast and in the East a failure with prospects of being
driven entirely out of this trade. They now turned their eyes
westward to the Dutch colony in America, which lay between the
Connecticut and Delaware Rivers, This little colony had managed
to maintain itself for more than half a century, in spite of the
constant opposition of the English colonists. The first Dutch on
the ground were probably the crew of Henry Hudson, an Englishman
in the service of the Dutch in 1609. During the years 1609-14,
Dutch traders came to the Hudson River to trade v/ith the natives,
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although this coast was claimed by the English in virtue of the
Cabot's discovery, the charter granted to Raleigh, and the Virgin-
ia Charter of 1606. There is a tradition that Samuel Argall in
1613 secured from the Dutch under threats, a promise that they
1
would come there no more, but whether true or not, it was not
carried out. Before 1614, one or more forts were built and in
that year the States General granted to a company of merchants for
three years, the exclusive trade on the American coast from 40**-
45®, which had been discovered by them and v;hich v/as to be called
2
New Netherlands. The States General must have known these mer-
chants were not the discoverers of this region, v/hich from the
time of Verrazano to Pring had been visited by the French and
English explorers. This grant was also a breach of international
law which gave possession to the sovereign of an explorer, new
land not formerly claimed by any Christain prince or inhabited by
any Christian nation. In 1621 the King, on complaint of Argall,
Mason and others, who had intended to take a colony to this dis-
puted region, requested his ambassador at The Hague to protest to
the States General against this intrusion into Virginia.*^ They
4
replied that they knew nothing of the enterprise.
In 1621, the Dutch West India Company was formed and the Dutch
colonists spread over a large territory, to the Connecticut River
on the East, the Delaware River on the West,and Fort Orange on the
North, This expansion of trade and territory brought the Dutch in-
to conflict v/ith the English colonists and during the years 1620-40
1 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-8, § 177.
2 New York Colonial Documents I,, 10.
3 Ibid, 27.
4 Ibid, 58.
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there were continuous local feuds over boundary lines, trade, cus-
toms, and relations with the Indians. These disputes sometimes
reached the States General and King in Europe, The Dutch, in
memorials to the States General based their claim to this terri-
tory on Hudson's discovery. In a memorial drawn up in 1632, they
spoke of the first discovery, by the Dutch, of the river "commonly
called Rio de Montaigne or North River", unconsciously conceding
their predecessors by the use of the French and English niimes."^
It is significant that the Dutch in their complaints to the King
of Englcind did not base their claims to Manhattan or to trading
privileges in this region on prior discovery, but on the purchase
2
of the island from the Indians and long continued trade there.
The king denied that the Indians were bona fide possessors and
3
able to dispose of the land, and considered the Dutch usurpers in
this region. In 1632, he declared that "if the Dutch remained
there without his license, they will impute it to themselves if
4hereafter they suffer".
When in 1663, the English government began to seriously in-
vestigate the matter, they found that the Dutch colony of New
NetherlF,nds was a serious menace to their trading interests. The
Farmers of Customs stated that over 10,000'£a year in customs were
lost by the traders of the Southern plajitations carrying their to-
5
.bacco to the Dutch plantations and eluding the Navigation Act,
The New England colonists claimed that their trade had been v/rest-
1 New York Colonial Documents I,, 51.
2 Ibid, 56.
3 Ibid, 58.
4 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial, 1574-1600, § 62.
5 New York Colonial Documents III., 47,
Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-8, 177,
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I
ed from them by the "nutch, "the miserable state of Ti'n.cllsh inter-
ests cryin."- aloud for remedy".'^ The Tutch prevented the execution
of the Navigation Acts by disobeyinf?; the law themselves and en-
couraging the "p'nglish colonists to do the same.
j
Thus, in 1663, Fngland sav/ her merchants and traders driven
! out of their trade by the "^utch in Africa and in India in the
East, and in America and the ^"est Indies in the ^''est, v/hile the
royal income was seriously affected by the losses of the Ro^'-al Af-
rican Dompany and the evasion of the Navigation Acts. The (7ov-
!
ernment now made one p-reat effort to revive her commercial inter-
ests in the ^Past and the -'est.
The Council for "Plantations, July 6, ordered that a state-
ment should be drawn up of (1) the >'np-lish title to the territory
on the Hudson Kiver, (2) the intrusion of the "Dutch, (3) their
deportment, strength, and trade and (4) means to m.ake them ac-
2knowledge or submit to his Majesty's 'Government,
j
A flourishin/7 trade was set up with the Spanish in the ^"est
Indies. The King gave free license to Spanish traders and plant-
ers in America to trade with Jamaica, "Rarbadoes and the Haribee
3
Islands, The Spaniards bought great numbers of slaves and "fill-
4
ed the islands with m.oney". T>utch trade in this ren;ion was ser-
iously affected by the competition in the slave trade with the
'^'^est Indies, and by the frequent confiscation of their ships.
I
1 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-8, ^ 622.
2 Few York Colonial Tocuraents TTI. , 46.
3 Ibid, ^ 425.
4 Ibid, ^ 417.
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England made one more attempt to revive her trade on the Af-
rican coast and sent Captain Holmes out again in the fall of 1663
to protect t}ie property of the Royal African Company and preserve
their freedom of trade with the natives."^
Constant rumors of war hegan to float alDout in the early
spring of 1664, and Dooming wrote in March that the Dutch "were
"beginning to take alarm at the great talk in England of wars v/ith
this country; but it is needful that they be quickened a little
2
for they regard not words."
The two countries maintained a very different attitude to-
ward the prospect of war. Downing wrote from Holland, April 18,
1664, that "those who govern here have neither design nor desire to
fall out with his Majesty. On the contrary, it is the thing in
the world they dread most." "Already, the common people here be-
gin to cry out, What! must we have a war for the East and West
4
India Companies? We would rather pull them by the ears."
In England, hov/ever, as early as February, "all the court
5
were mad for war", though Pepys thought it a thing to be dreaded
rather than hoped for. He said April 1, "the Duke called me to
him and talked of the Dutch and I perceive do much wish that Par-
6
liament would fall out v/ith them". A few days later he "discuss-
ed with the Duke on the condition of the fleet in order to a Dutch
7
war, for that I perceive the Duke hath a mind it shall come to".
The Committee for Trade gathered together the complaints of
1 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1663-4, 235.
2 Lister's Clarendon III., 299,
3 Ibid, 305.
4 Ibid, 307.
5 Pepys II. , 98.
6 Ibid, 113.
7 Ibid, 114.
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the merc>innts and conr'^errlal companiee apalrtpt the Pintch and drew
up a report of their injuries, which "they resoiv-^d to report very
1
hi^^hly". This report was read before the House of CornFons by a
Fr. Thomas Clifford on April 21, and the House of Lords the fol-
lo^'/lnf^ day. In this report were set forth the losses of the i'ast
India Company, Turkey, and Poyal African Company, caused by the
blockades of the harbors, seizure of forts, ships, and poods, and
refusal to deliver Pularoon. Their total loss war, estimated at
714, 500^, "while a conipensat ion of 4,000,000£ would be ,1ust for
the loss of Pularoon". In view of these losses and the failure
of the Jiutch to make any satisfaction, buth houses agreed that the
"wrongs, dishonors, and indignities done to his J'ajesty by the sub-
jects of the United Provinces . . . are the p-reatest obstruction
to our foreign trade and that his 'ajesty be moved to take some
speedy and effectual ootirses for their redress and prevention of
- (»
2
the like in the future. Both houses unanimously pledged their
lives and fortunes against all opposition. The King expressed his
satisfaction with the action of the two Houses and said that he
would have his minister at The Hague demand reparation from the
Dutch, but if justice v;ere denied, he v/ould then rely on the prom.-
3ises of both houses to stand by him. It might be noted here that
while the House' of Commons consisted of over four hundred members,
only about one hundred fifty v/ere voting in April of 1664, which
might indicate that those not in sympathy with the policy of the
leaders v:ere staying away.
1 Pepys II. , 119.
2 Lord's .Journals, 599.
3 Calendar of ^tate "Papers, domestic 1663-4, 571.
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The career of Mr. Thomas Clifford is significant, "becauae of
his rapid rise in royal favor from thia time on. Previous to his
appearance before Parliament in April 1664, he seems to have been
a comparatively unknown man. He was chosen by the Committee of
Trade to lay the grievances of the English merchants before Par-
liament, probably because he was a good speaker, and could present
the matter effectively. The unanimous vote of Parliament may tes-
tify to his success. October 11, Pepys said he heard one Sir Thom-
as Clifford speak that day, "whom yet I knew not, but do speak
very well and neatly.""^ Clifford, then within six months after
his appearance before Parliament, had been knighted by the King,
though he was still comparatively obscure since Pepys did not know
him yet. He rose rapidly into prominence after this. In December
21664 he was Commissioner for the Sick and Wounded and in August
,
3
1665, he was sent as an envoy to Dejimark,
With the assurance that he was backed by Parliament, Charles
now began to aggressively assert English claims and interests. On
March 12, 1664, he had granted to the Duke of York that territory
lying between the St. Croix River a,nd Pemaquid, and that between
the Connecticut and Delaware Rivers with Long Island, Martha's
Vineyard and Nantucket Island.^ April 23, two days after the vote
of Parliament, he sent out a commission under Colonel Nicholls,
with secret instructions to secure possession of Hew Netherlands
and reduce the inhabitants to obedience to the King, that the whole
1 Pepys II., 174,
2 Calendar of State Papers , Domestic 1663-4, 112.
3 Ibid, 535.
4 Calendar of State Papers , Colonial 1661-8, § 685.
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trade might be carried on by the English.^
The news of the action of Parliament on April 21, created
2
consternation in Holland, and De Witt with several of his leading
men immediately provided for a conference to adjust past and fu-
ture questions. By May 6, the States General had resolved to set-
tle the matter of the five ships under dispute, (the Hopewell and
Leopard seized on the coast of India and the Charles, James, and
Mary on the African coast) and were willing to accept a plan dra;vn
up by De Witt and Downing for the future regulation of trade in
4
Africa, India, etc. They could come to no agreement, however,
concerning the Bona Aventura and Esperanza, Downing insisted that
no agreement could be reached between the two countries unless
4
satisfaction were made for these two ships. It too nearly touched
the King's honor, he said, and the persons concerned had such in-
fluence upon him, and his Majesty had so engaged his word to them,
5
that it was impossible to retreat in this matter. The treaties
of 1654 and 1662 had left this question to be decided, as it had
been begun, a process betv/een the two parties concerned. Downing
now took it up and made it an affair of state. De Witt claimed
that the matter was in a fair way to be settled in the summer of
1664; that Gary, acting for Courten's executors, had confessed to
his friends that he had resolved to accept the Dutch offer of
thirty thousand pounds rather than 3e t the dispute continue any
longer. Before he had done so, however, Downing interfered and
1 New York Colonial Documents III,
,
51.
Calendar of State Papers C denial 1661-8, § 113.
2 Lister's Clarendon III,, 314-8.
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forbade him to make a treaty without his consent. Downing, then
made extravagant demands with his characteristic insolence tov/ard
the Dutch. He probably expected that the Dutch would be willing
to make great concessions, rather than be drawn into a .var with
England. De V/itt said it was impossible to yield to these demands
which not only they, but the English also, knew were not just,"^
Preparations for war nov; went on rapidly in both countries.
Coventry, Secretary to the Duke of York was "now full of talk of
a Dutch war", and with Pepys, Secretary to the Admiralty, began to
2lay in stores for the approaching conflict. Ormond returned from
Ireland to supervise the equipment of the fleet of thirty vessels,
and an order was issued for the impressment of ten thousand men.
A good deal of enthusiasm seems to have been shov/n in the prepara-
tion of the fleet. The seamen offered themselves in such great
numbers that the required number v/ould soon be secured and the
3
fleet was almost ready for u^a by tnsj end of May, Most of the
twenty-five nev.' captains appointed to take charge of the ships,
3had served under Cromwell.
In Holland quite a different spirit was shown. The Province
of Holland worked ^ith might and main to prepare a suitable fleet
4
and by the middle of May had sixteen men-of-war ready for use.
The other provinces refused to take part in the preparation for
defence. Although "those of Holland solicited them mightily, they
refused to engage themselves and spend their money to maintain the
insolvencies of the East India Company". They "still hoped no
1 Temple's Works III., 91.
2 Pepys II. , 119.
3 Lister's Clarendon III., 318.
4 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1663-4, 596.
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breach would or could fall out; if the dispute was v/ith the East
and West India Company and violences done by them, t'ney should be
,
ranged to reason and give satisfaction, and not be maintained in
their evil deeds at the cost and hazard of the country.
In April, Holland recalled Tromp from the Mediterranean and
sent out De Ruyter in his place. In June, he met Lawson and
"struck his flag and saluted with all demonstrations of friendship
and was answered with the like in point of salute but not in the
flag".^
In April, news of Holmes *s aggressions on the African coast
began to reach Europe. His instructions had been to protect the
f
property of the Royal African Company and preserve their freedom
of trade, but he had far exceeded his orders. He first seized
Cape Verde, a strong Dutch fort, and replaced the Dutch by an
English garrison. At Sestor, he met the Dutch general, Valchen-
burg and tried to reach a friendly settlement of differences, but
failed. As he went dovm the coast he was continually opposed by
the Dutch. Angered, perhaps by this opposition and the factors*
stories of Dutch oppression. Holmes seems to have completely for-
gotten the purpose for which he was sent and begun a wholesale
capture of all Dutch property he was strong enough to take. In
January, 1664, he captured the island of Goree, the chief Dutch
factory in Northern Guinea, and which controlled all the trade in
this region. He captured the Dutch fort at Cape Corso, v/here he
left a garrison, and also seized several other Dutch forts. He
seized the Golden Lion, the chief Dutch ship on the African coast,
1 Lister's Clarendon III,, 322.
2 Historical Mss. Commission, Heathcote, 37.
3 Calendar of State Papers , Colonial 1661-S, § 954.
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,
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and several ethers. The Dutch losses were very great, while
Holmes returned in December with a cargo worth from tv/o to three
thousand pounds,^ News of Holmes's aggressions gradually reached
Europe as ship after ship arrived from Africa.
The English government probably realized that a strong fleet
would be a valuable possession when the news in full reached Hol-
2
land, A fleet of twelve ships was almost ready for Sandwich and
June 13, the King issued another order to the Duke of York for the
preparation of a fleet of ships v.ith others to second it; al-
so an order for the impressment of tv/o thousand mariners and the
3
necessary workmen. Already a change in the attitude of the peo-
ple of England was evident. In May, the sailors had responded to
the call with enthusiasm and in great numbers. In June, Pepys
informed the Duke that it would be necessary to impress the men
4 .
to man this fleet,
i About this time, the news of the loss of Cape Verde reached
Holland. June 19, 1664, Van Gogh was sent over to England by the
Dutch government to demand the restoration of Cape Verde, to set-
tle the question of the two ships, and to keep the Dutch authori-
5
ties informed of the naval condition of England,
About the middle of June, Morice, Secretary of State, and
Downing expressed to Cunaeus, the Dutch Secretary at London, their
concern over the fleets which were being prepared by both nations.
If they v/ere sent to sea, there might arise hostilities without
1 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-8, § 954,
i! Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1664-5, 170 & 235.
I
2 Pepys II. , 128.
3 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1663-4, 614.
4 Pepys II. , 128.
I
5 Brieven de J. de Witt, 365-7.
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the consent or orders of the government,^ When De Witt received
this news from Curaeas, he at once wrote a letter to the English
King and assured hi;a that he would detain the Dutch fleet at home,
if England would do the same. He requested an immediate reply
from Charles in writing, promising that he would detain the Eng-
lish fleet at home on these conditions, for if he did not, he
(De Witt) would be forced to send the fleet to sea to protect the
fisheries and returning East India merchantmen,'^ If the two
fleets should meet, hostilities might break out contrary to the
2
wishes of either side. He assured the King that the ships al-
ready sent to the North v/ere only to defend the fishing trade and
3
to stay near at home - not to annoy the King's subjects. Al-
though the English first expressed concern over the meeting of the
two fleets and De Witt immediately promised to restrain his fleet
if England would do the same, there is no evidence that Charles
sent such a promise. On the contrary "the King only laughed at
this proposition, but yet v;as troubled that they should think him
such a child to suffer them to bring home their fish and 'East In-
3
dia Company ships and then they would not care for us".
De Witt insisted that peace could not continue unless imme-
diate reparation were made for the attack on Cape Verde. The
King began to be alarmed at the warlike preparations of the States
and remonstrated against the naval preparations of both countries.
Still he gave no indication that he -would accept De Witt's pro-
posal, although De Witt insisted that it ms absolutely necessary
1 Brieven de J, De Witt, 305-7.
2 Ibid, 308.
3 Pepys IT. , 136.
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that the King should assure him he would keep his fleets at home,
for otherwise public opinion would force him to send the fleet to
sea,''" On the contrary, there was every indication that the Eng-
2
lish would send their fleet to sea as soon as it was prepared.
Van Gogh believed it was to be sent out for trade purposes with
no intention of attack on the Dutch. Many of the nobles, the
King, Clarendon, and others as well as the merchants, he said,
were desirous of peace because the credit was poor, treasury was
2
empty and the people were opposed to war.
July 1, De Witt declared that the failure of the English king
to reply categorically on the matter of the detention of the Eng-
lish fleet, would lead one to believe that it was to be used. The
States could not permit the English to have open field for an at-
tack on their merchantmen, therefore the moment that the English
fleet started for the North, that moment the Dutch fleet would
sail. In case of hostilities, the Dutch believed they could show
3
the world that they had attempted to avoid the conflict,
De Witt again demanded a written statement from Charles that
he would restore Ca-pe Verde and ships, if it were discovered that
they had been taken by his subjects. The English government
frankly admitted that the capture of Cape Verde was a great breach
of orders, but "the Duke seemed inclined to pardon it on account
4
of the courage and success of the attempt". The King refused to
grant this request, as he desired to first hear what Holmes had to
1 Brieven de J, De Witt, 308.
2 Ibid, 309.
3 Brieven de J. De Witt, 311,
4 Calendar of State Papers ,Domestic 1664-5, 92,
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say for himself.
By July 8, the King declared he could not keep his fleets at
home because his honor was engaged. Van Gogh thought he seemed
to be influenced by persons who for peculiar reasons did not want
I
peace, ^ The Duke assured Van Gogh that he had given orders not to
attack the Dutch fleets and that there was no intention of injury-
' 2
ing the subjects of the Provinces.
I The French King, who in April 1662, had made a treaty of al-
liance with the Dutch, now began to be seriously concerned at the
warlike preparations of both states. By this treaty, each had en-
gaged that in case either should be injured or attacked by another
.
country, the ally, which was not involved in the rupture, should
break with the aggressor within four months after the first re-
quisition. During this period, her ambassadors should do all in
their power to mediate between the two hostile nations and give
3
j
powerful aid to her ally.
Prance had no desire to become involved in a war with England,
so on July ?, the French ambassador offered mediation to the
States, By July 15, all the states of Holland except Zealand
(which acquiesced later) had accepted the mediation of the French
king,^ The French Ambassador at London then offered Charts II.
the mediation of Louis XIV, for the settlement of the question of
the two ships, which was supposed to be the bone of contention.
He suggested that the question should be decided by four lawyers
appointed by each side, and if they could not agree, it should be
i 1 Brieven de J. de Witt, 317-8.
I 2 Ibid, 313.
3 Dumont's Corps Diplomatique XII,, 412-6.
4 Brieven de J. De Witt, 316,
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referred to the Parlement of Paria. Charles is reijorted to have
said the matter would solve itself without intervention."^ Thus,
Charles refused every proposition which was made to prevent the
outbreak of war. He would not agree to keep the fleets within
their harbors; he would make no promise that he would restore
Dutch property illegally taken; he would not accept the mediation
of a third person on a question which it seemed impossible to set-
tle between themselves.
In the latter part of July in 1664, there was no reason why
the peace should not be preserved between the two nations, provid-
ed England desired to have it so. The Provinces asked for the re-
turn of Cape Verde (the news of Holmes' capture of their other
forts in Africa had not yet reached Europe), Since it was admit-
ted that it had been taken without orders, there was no reason why
it should have been allov;ed to prevent the maintenance of peact.
England had demanded reparation for her ships. Holland had agreed
to make restitution for her five ships and accept the agreement
for the settlement of future disputes. As for the two ships, Hol-
land had tried by several means, as had also Prance, to settle this
old dispute and England had refused to agree to any of them. Al-
bermarle summed up the true state of a.ffairs very well when he said
it was not a matter of adjustment of differences but of larger
2
trade for England.
July 29, Van Gogh wrote De Witt that all hope of securing
restitution of Cape Verde must be practically abandoned, but added
1 Brieven de J. De Witt, 324-5.
2 Ibid, 327-8.
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that if one could check the work going on on the African coaet,
the Royal African Company would be ruined."^ De Witt firmly be-
lieved the English fleet was to be sent out to Guinea to maintain
their new as well as their old acquisitions. This letter may have
suggested to De Witt the idea of secretly sending out a fleet to
Guinea to regain the Dutch possessions on the African coast before
the English fleet arrived. Or, some plan to avenge the losses in-
flicted by Holmes may have been forming in his mind during the
months of June and July, and when he found it impossible to secure
justice by diplomacy, but one means remained. As early as January,
1662, Clarendon had expressed the fear that De Witt might send
such orders abroad as to produce war before England was aware of
it.
2
August 16, 1664, a messenger from Holland passed through
3
Madrid with orders for De Ruyter to go with his fleet to Guinea.
So secretly and so v/ell was this managed, that no one, except
those concerned in the expedition, had the slightest intimation
of De Ruyter 's intentions until after his departure from the Med-
4
iterranean, September 27. Prom the sources at hand, there is no
positive proof that De Witt gave these orders, but his later act-
ions seem to justify this conclusion. Y/hether the plan was devised
and executed by De Witt alone, or with his Junto or the whole
States General is a question. When the news of De Ruyter 's expe-
5
dition became public, Coventry thought De Witt, alone, was re-
1 Brieven de J. De Witt, 332.
Z Lister's Clarendon III., 180.
3 Historical Mss, Commission, Heathcote, 163 & 170.
4 Ibid, 166.
5 Calendar of State Papers ,Domestic 1664-5, 88,
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sponsible. Downing insisted that no such deliberation had been
heard in the Estates, rauoh less any resolution ta^en. Later or-
ders for De Ruyter were decided on by De Witt with his Junto.
Downing said that if his spy,v\4iich he had in the Junto, had been
in The Hague in July, he would have known of De V/itt*s plan of
1
Blending De Ruyter to Guinea.
The Dutch continued the preparation of the fleet ./ith appar-
ently as much zeal as ever, but gave orders that the ships destined
for Guinea were not to attack English trade, so long as the Dutch
West India Company was not disturbed or attacked. This seemed
only to anger the English more and they declared such a orovision
3
was not in accordance with the late treaty, so, the relations be-
tween the two countries became more and more strained. In re-
sponse to a petition for protection, the King fitted out a fleet
of twelve ships for Prince Rupert to convoy the ships of the Roy-
4
al African Company to Guinea. A Dutch fleet of twenty- tv/o men-
of-war cruised off the coast near Ostend, and SandwiQh hastened
5back into the Downs with only eight ships.
The, Duke seems to have shovm an unnecessarily aggressive at-
titude, especially since he knew nothing yet of De Ruyter 's expe-
dition. About September 1-6, he had an audience with the Dutch am-
bassador. He told him that, "whereas they think us in jest, he
believed Prince Rupert, who goes in this fleet to Guinny will soon
tell them that we are in earnest and that he himself will do the
6
like here at home".
1 Lister's Clarendon III., 358. .
2 Brieven de J. De Witt, 353-4.
3 Ibid, 367.
4 Calendar of State Papers ,Domestic 1663-4, 66.
5 Pepys II. , 162.
6 Ibid, 164.'

40
In the early part of Se^jtember, it was rumored In Amsterdam
that De Ruyter had been privately ordered a month ago to go with
his fleet to Guinea, "but by September 9, the report began to die
down again. When Downing heard the report, he asked De Witt
where De Ruyter would go when he had cleaned hi.s ships. De Witt
said he would go back to Algiers and Tunis to ransom their people
there .
^
DoviTiing suggested that Lawson should be ordered to keep a
close watch on De Ruyter and wrote, "what if Sir John Laws on
should have an order to meet Princ e Ruper t
,
thereby to make sur e
work, and to give out that he was returning home and not let any-
I body about him know the contrary till off all land ? that would put
2
an immediate end to that business " . Whatever may have been the
motives of the English government in the preparation of the fleet
in the early summer of 1664, their motives were evident in Septem-
ber.
j
De Witt once more tried to form an agreement between the two
states. He proposed that the Dutch should yield in regard to the
five ships and that England should give full satisfaction for the
II
Dutch losses on the coast of Guinea, in case it were found that
Holmes had not been incited to take Cape Verde by the attacks of
the Hollanders, This offer, he said, could not v/ell be refused
without openly announcing an intention to take the coast away from
3
the Dutch by force of arms. The English government, directed
I by three or four persons, so Van Gogh said, refused the offer,
1 Lister's Clarendon III,, 345,
2 Ibid, 352,
3 Ibid, 345.
4 Brieven de J, De V/itt, 353-4,

We might surmise who were these three or four persona, who
directed the English government and obstinately opposed and re-
jected all overtures for peace. Pre-eminent was the Duke of York,
Lord High Admiral and Governor of the Royal African Company, who
in April was determined on war,"^ Coventry, Secretary of the Duke
and Assistant of the Royal African Company, Bennet, Secretary of
2 6State, and the Duke of Albenaarle. Several of txiese men were
members of the Royal African Company and were interested in its
success. Whether their private interests influenced their public
position or their attitude toward the questions novf arising be-
tween the English and Dutch is an open question.
In October, Clarendon again intimated to Van Gogh that, if
the Dutch fleet were kept at home, a. good settlement for the fu-
ture could be made on the question of commerce. He said nothing,
4however, of retaining the English fleet at home. The Dutch still
had trouble in raising their fleet, due to the lack of unity.
Some of the towns objected to the necessa.ry tax a,nd seme of the
5provinces refused to give the required number of ships,
October 13, Lawson returned to England from the Mediterranean
and brought the nev/s that De Ruyter had taken in a great supply of
provisions, and with a fleet of ten or tv/elve ships had probably
6
departed for the coast of Guinea, September 27, Three days
later, October 16, news arrived that Holmes had captured Cape
7
Corso on May 7. Van Gogh immediately forv/arded these news to
1 Pepys II.
, 113.
2 Parliamentary History IV., 303-5. Clarendon says in 1664
that Bennet and Coventry brought the war on the nation,
3 Brieven de J. de V/itt, 327-8.
4 Ibid, 270.
5 Historical Mss, Commission, Heathcote, 167,
6 Ibid, 166.
7 Brieven de J. de Witt, 375-6.
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De Witt, who wrote that he considered the apprehension that De
Ruyter had gone to Guinea miraculous and as having appeared at a
proper time, for Prince Rupert was still detained and an accommo-
dation might yet "be made.^ De Witt, thus, shrev/dly kept his own
amhassador in ignorance of the truth, that he might "be better able
to negotiate for peace.
Mews of the capture of New Netherlands reached Europe in
Octoher, 1664. De Witt said "v/e hope here to avoid war hut the
failure of the King to declare categorically for the restitution
of forts and ships in Africa, together with New Netherlands, will
force us to hostilities.
About the middle of August, four English men-of-war had ap-
peared off the Long Island shore and demanded the surrender of
the "King's territories, at present usurped by the Dutch". Every
Dutchman who submitted was assured of his life, liberty and es-
tates, but those that opposed must suffer the consequences. Stuy-
vesant remonstrated and cited the Dutch claims to this territory.
It is significant that he made no claim on the ground of prior
discovery or possession, but based their right to this region
on the various grants and commissions issued by the States Gener-
al and on long continued occupancy. But the right of the States
General to make these grants was questionable, Stuyvesant saw the
futility of resistance in the presence of force from without and
dissension within the town and v/as compelled to sign the Articles
of Surrender, August 29. New Amsterdam then passed into the hands
1 Brieven de J. de Witt, 375-6,
2 Ibid, 377-8.
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of the English without the use of force."'" The terms of surrender
were very liberal. No chanf?e was to be made in the life, customs
or possessions of the inhabitants except a transfer of allefriance
2
to the King of England. This was followed by the capture of the
Dutch Eort Aurania on the present site of Albany and of the Dutch
forts on Delaware Bay, some of which did not give up until taken
by force. The divided sentiment of the American colonies is sho'»vn
in the fact that while the people of New England were pleased over
the suppression of the Dutch, who were a serious menace to New
England trade, the people of Maryland were much displeased, as it
put an end to their profitable, but illegal sale of tobacco to the
Dutch.
After Lawson's return, it was generally accepted in the
streets of London that De Ruyter had gone to Guinea. The King
called a council of the principal nobles and discussed the ques-
tion whether to break with the Hollanders but no decision could
5
be reached. The King and particularly the Duke of York were much
offended over the De Ruyter rumors. Van Gogh wrote that he had
"assured them it was amusing to suppose De Ruyter had gone to
Guinea, ordered either by the States General, a particular prov-
ince, or an individual," but added, "but this is not much for I
6
know nothing." Two months, then, had passed since De Witt order-
ed De Ruyter to go to Guinea, yet his ambassador in England had not
the slightest intimation of the truth. He ordered Van Gogh to
make use of the rumor about De Ruyter to reach a settlement,
1 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-8, 5 788.
2 Ibid, 5 794.
3 Ibid, 61-68, 5 857.
4 New York Colonial Documents III. , 69-70.
5 Brieven de J. De Witt, 379-80.
6 Ibid, 383.
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Clarendon refined +o ""-^plleve the report that '^f^ ''uytpr had
rone to Guinea, hut t'o uke of York accepted t^e Popular serti-
ment. "It is a marvelous thin^," Clarendon said, "that they can
think f^'At our apprehension that he has rone, can dispose us to
anythinp- hut indirnation, fo they are not wise in lettinr v?. he-
lieve it, if it is not true." Clarendon war still disposed to-
wards peace and wished the "Hutch had "entertained a disposition
towards peace sooner. They have too insolently provoked the king
to such an expense thp.t firhtinr is thought the better husbandry."
In spite of his peaceful inclinations, he refused to consider the
idea of returning l^ew :ietherlands which "had been usurped by the
Dutch, who had no color of right to it, and the recapture of which
was no violation of the treaty. As for Cape Verde, although it
was taken without the least shadov/ of justice, the imperious way
of the Dutch demanding it was not to be endured. If they sincere-
ly desire peace, they will keep their fleets in the harbor, for if
they come out, nothing short of a riracle can prevent f irhting. ""^
F?o, peace might be mxaintained if the Dutch made no TDrotest arainst
the seizure of their possessions, whether legally or illegally
taken, and kept their fleets off the seas. There v/as not much
choice for the Dutch betv/een the tvvfo alternatives,
October 13, news came from. Holland that Opdam's fleet was
victualed and, as soon as the wind v/as rirht for the ships to <^et
out of the Texel, Opdam v/as to convoy the Cuinea fleet through the
2Channel, in defiance of the small T^nglish fleet stationed there
1 Lister's Clarendon III., 346.
2 Historical Vss, Commission, Heathcote, 167.
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to prevent it. Accordingly, the preparation of tyie English fleet
of sixty vessels way energetically pushed ty the Duke of York, who
decided to take command- in-chief of the fleet. Sandwich and Ted-
2
diman were sent to the Channel to stop t}:e Dutch men-of-war, Penn
v/aa to join the Duke,' Lawson went to Portsmouth,^ and Rupert set
5
sail for Guinea, Octoher 7. It is noticeable that the fleet was
officered "by men who had gained their experience and training dur-
ing the Protectorate and were confident of English superiority on
the seas.
The unfortunate Rupert was soon in disfavor "/ith the home
government. October 24, news came that he was windbound at Ports-
mouth and that there was much opposition and discontent among the
men about going to Guinea, Rupert himself, was afraid to pro-
ceed on his journey because of the great Dutch fleet under Opdam
and wrote to headquarters of the danger to which he and his fleet
were exposed. Clarendon was much displeased with him, but order-
ed him to lay up the fleet at Cowes.'
October 28, 1664, the King issued a "declaration for the en-
couragement of searaen" by which all seamen, whether on the King's
ships or merchantmen, should receive 10s. per ton on all prizes
taken by them, 6£, 13s. 4d. for each piece of ordnance and 10£
Q
a gun for every man of war sunk or destroyed.
Prom September, there was a change in De Witt's attitude in
1 Calendar of State Papers , Domestic , 1664-5 , 56,
2 Historical Mss. Commission, Heathcote, 170,
3 Pepys II. , 173,
4 Ibid, 175.
5 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1664-5, 27.
6 Ibid, 45.
7 Pepys II. , 178.
8 Lister's Clarendon III., 348.
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the negotiations betv/een the two countries. Hitherto, De Witt
had "been an eager suppliant for peace, and had ^jresented one plan
after another "by v;hich the differences betv/een the two nations
might be settled. All his advances had resulted in failure. In
November, when Downing tried to reach an agreement, De V/itt said
he would give satisfaction if it were done as he said, v/hen
regulations for the future finally seemed satisfactory to both
sides, De Witt demanded that it must include regulations for mat-
ters in Europe, also."^ Downing had no orders to arrange for mat-
ters in Europe and protested against this demand, but in vain.
It is quite probable that De Witt insisted on this provision be-
cause of the attitude of Prance at this time, France was bound
by the treaty to aid Holland only in case hostilities broke out
2
over the violation of rights in Europe, and the other country
were the aggressor. "Her ambassador now began to throw out doubts
whether they would be bound to aid the Dutch in this case, since
the quarrel was over matters outside Europe. Por this reason De-
Witt demanded that the agreement should include regulations for
Europe as well as the outlying parts of the world. De Witt, hov/-
ever , seemed to desire to prolong negotiations. He may have de-
sired to know the outcome of De Ruyter's expedition before com-
mitting himself. Or he may have believed that if De Ruyter were
successful, he could dictate his ovm terms.
Downing pressed De Witt for the truth of the De Ruyter ru-
mors, but he replied "that as to that he would say no more than
he had done; that if we did believe it, that notv/ithstanding what
1 Lister's Clarendon III,, 348.
2 Historical Mss. Commission, Heathcote
, 174.
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Downing had said to the contrary, he did not think the belief
1
could do any hurt." De Witt would surely have tried to pacify
the English by either denyinc this rumor or by saying he knew
nothing of it, if he could have done so. Instead, he refused to
discuss the matter at all, so that his silence seemed to indicate
the truth of the rumor.
November 4, the King called Parliament and laid before them
an account of the events of the last few months (April-November),
He told of the naval and military preparations for the war which
he was compelled to declare for the "protection, honor and bene-
fit of his subjects." He related the English grievances and loss-
es in all parts of the world, but failed to present some things
in their true light. He said he had promised satisfaction to the
Dutch, yet Van Gogh had tried for t.w months to secure a promise
for the return of Cape Verde, which all admitted had been taken
without orders; as for Cape Corso and New Netherlands, they had
been taken by the King's order*^ and need not be considered.
The King also gave the impression that the Dutch first made
the proposal that the fleets of both countries should be main-
tained in the harbors and said that "at the same time they made
this plausible overture, they sent orders to their fleet in the
Straits under the command of De Ruyter, to make all possible haste
to Guinea to execute those instructions which they had given to
their fleet here," The proposition to keep the fleets in the
harbors was made June 17 in reply to a suggestion first made by
the English, and De Ruyter was not ordered out to Guinea until
1 Lister's Clarendon III., 348,
2 Brieven de J. De Witt, 387,
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August afte>- trr> fT.iVirp' of "^^r^n ^o^h or Pe ^''ift to secure the
slightest cone '3s;jiuni3 oi- acyurance of satlpfaction. The Kinri at
this time had no positive proof that ""^e Ruyter had rone to 'Guinea,
hut merely that he had left the T'''edi terranean in r^eptemher. ^o,
he cited the many points of dispute and v/hen he had finished,
"both Houses enthusiastically pledged themselves to assist his
Majesty in the preservation of the honor, safety and trade of the
nation, and expressed their thanks for his preparations for their
1
defense against the Dutch.
Parliament, hov/ever, accordinf!: to Van 'lon-'h was "composed
largely of members devoted to the Kinpr and Court, eighty heing
dependent on the Court and many of the nobles having suffered v/ith
the King. Many of the other side absent themselves and Parliament
2
will vote what the King desires." Rapin called it the "Pension-
ary Parliament, elected by the influence of the court and many of
3
its members receiving pensions from the Court. The question
arises whether this unanimous vote in favor of war was an expres-
sion of the will and sentiments of the people.
As early as June, a change was noticeable in the attitiide of
the people, in their unwillingness to co-operate in the prepara-
tion of the fleet. This developed into open opposition as the
relations between England and Holland became more strained. Or-
ders were ipsued for the impressment of ship-wrights
,
caulkers,
rope-makers, sailors, etc., but those pressed either did not ap-
pear or ran away. The Duke of York complained that two hundred
4
had left the service v/ithin a few days, and every ship missed
1 Lord's Journals XI., 625.
2 Brieven de J. De Witt, 394.
3 Parliam.entary History IV. , 194.
4 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1664-5, 52.
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from twenty to one hundred men."^ Coventry and Middleton declared
2
that nothing short of hanging would man this fleet, and aent a
list of some fit to be used as an example in the several counties
3
where they v/ere pressed. Most of those /ho did appear, so the
commissioners said, never saw a ship before and v/ere more fit to
4keep sheep than sail in such great ships.
Complaints came in of mutinies among the workmen in the navy
5 6yard at Portsmouth and Deptford where the "shipwrights and
caulkers worked very slo>vly whereby the service is much impeded
7
where most expedition is required." Commissioner Middleton com-
plained that he "met with very different husbandry in the King's
Q
service from what he was accustomed to in his youth." The boat-
swains used "any rope, however unfit it be for service, the more
8
masts lost the more profit for them". Complaints came in of the
equipment of the ships. One ship lost all her masts through de-
fect of her shrouds; the anchors broke and proved to be made of
9
broken iron beaten over. There were many complaints of the rig-
ging of the ships in general."'"^
Delay was caused by v;aiting the leisure of "the base cross-
grained v/aterraen" employed in carrying the timber, -^-^ and the com-
missioners met with no encouragement from the justices of the
1 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1664-5, 52,
2 Ibid, 68.
3 Ibid, 66.
4 Ibid, 28.
5 Ibid, 181.
6 Ibid, 189.
7 Ibid, 1663-4, 530,
8 Ibid, 1664-5, 204.
9 Ibid, 192.
10 Ibid., 25.
11 Ibid, 81.
)4 J
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•pevc^ i ^crclnr these men to do th'^i.r duty. Ir Olourl^epterp'HI
,
the rr.en o;:ienly refused to carry any nore timher and when t com-
1
! missioners applied to the.Judf2;e, he refused to rive an opinion.
I
In Harwich, a list of ahle searren in the town was sent to the Mayor
2
I
hut he v/oulci not cause them to be impressed. The rnayor - f T^-'"-^-''-
pcol allowed nineteen vessels to sail from the port hefore the
order for impressment was issued and then "the fifty seamen or-
dered from that town were chief Ij' taken fro - the plow". No v.^-^i'-
could be secured from the Mayor of Liverpool or the Earl of Derby,
3
Vice Admiral. These instances shov; the attitude of men of vari-
ous callings and stations in life, and display quite' a different
spirit toward the preparations for war from that expressed by
Parliament
.
In the Court, also, which had maintained an aggressive at-
'
* titude toward the Dutch during the year of 1664, there were m.en
strongly opposed to this policy. Clarendon had so strongly op-
posed the war "that the King .... laughs at him for a dull fel-
low and in all this business of the Dutch War does nothing by his
4
advice, hardly consulting him". The Lords of NorthJiumberland .
and Leicester, membpr^ of the Privy Council, and F5ir Robert Lonr,
5
j v/ho held a hio-h office at court, 'vvere strongly opposed to the v;ar.
Ormond, also, was opposed to the war policy. So, Parliam.ent and
the Court pushed on the preparations for v/ar, although there was
strong opposition to it among all cla.sses.
In the early part of November, the Dutch stopped a Swedish
1 Cf'Jendar of State Papers Domestic 1664-5, 159.
2 Ibid, 191.
3 Ibid, 236. -
. 4 Pepys, 191.
5 Tem.ple's V/orks III., 92.
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ships of masts bound for "Rnpiland as contra"hand, and refused to c^irt
it up. Enp;land clalined this was the first act of hostility-'- and
on November 15, issued orders to seize all ships belonginp- to the
p
TTnited Provinces. Larp;e numbers of ships were soon brou^T-^-t in
3
as pri-'-es. November 25, an order was issued that dispatches
should be sent to all foreip;n parts, especially Africa and Amer-
ica, announcing the seizure of all "Hutch ships and that letters
4
of reprisal should be speedily sent.
November 24, Coventry wrote Bennet that if the confiscation
of the Sv/edish ship of masts were given as the reason for seizing
the vessels of the I'lutch, it might blind them a little longer and
very good reprisals v/ere taken. "De Ruyter's going out is the
cause of the taking of ships," he said, "and therefore of war."
Fngland had no positive proof yet that Pie Ruyter had gone to ^ruin-
ea, so the order could not be justified on either basis. The Eng-
lish government showed a lack of good faith in its dealings with
Holland. Coventry said he could not see "why the Dutch ambassa-
dor should be told the King had resolved to set upon them; his
5
ignorance might have been very fortunate. Bowninn" thought it ad-
visable that the King should do all the mischief he could but not
declare war. Ve^pys was "at his office all morning (November 25),
to prepare an account of the charge we have been put to extraor-
dinary by the Dutch already, and brought it to appear 852,700^,
1 Pepys II. , 185.
2 Calendar of Ptate "'^apers ,Domestic 1664-5, 70.
3 'Teathcote ^'ss., 170. Pepys, II., 186.
4 Calendar of Htate "^apers ,7)0^' estic 1664-5, 90.
5 Ibid, 88.
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but God knows thia only a scare to Parliament to roake then fi-ve
1
the more iTioney".
The Kinfr cOTnmandef^ Cirendon and the Treasurer, F^outhampton
,
to :neet with soine nom^'ners of Parlianent ci.nd ofi^ers, on 'Vhom "ho
could depend, to decide on the neceseai'y sum Tor the xar and the
manner of proposinp: and conducting the matter "before Parliament.
They decided 'that a large sura must "he advanced to overawe the
I
Dutch and any who mifrht 'ce inclined to aid them. They finally de-
I
cided on two and one half millions and induced !^ir Robert Paston,
a Yorkshire prentleman, who was not a frequent speaker, and v/ould
not he suspected of being influenced by the Court, to propose this
2
sum to the Eouse of Coramons. Accordingly, at an opportune time,
Paston proposed that the sum of two and one half million pounds
should be voted to the King for the war. The silence of the House
was unbroken for a tim.e, and they sat as in amazem.ent. Another
I
member then arose and, disregarding the former motion pro-
posed a much smaller sum.. Two m.en, who had promised to second
Paston 's motion, renewed and seconded the first proposal. Af-
ter a short silence, the Speaker asked whether they v;ould give the
King two and one half millions for carrying on the war. "The af-
firmative made a good sound and very few gave their negative aloud
i
2
I
but it was notorious very many sat silent." So the vote was
I
drawn up into an order. Fnen they met the next day to consider
j
the m.anner of raising it, "they did not agree so well, but parted
[
late in the evening with great heat". On tlie following day, it was
! concluded peaceably that the House should proceed to consider the
1 Pepys, II. , 187,
2 Parliamentary History IV.
,
303-6'.
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raising of the 2, 500, OOo£.
November 30 and Pecei er 16, the King granted letters of
2
marque and reprisal a(j;airi8t t}i^ r)utcii, and large numhers of Dutcli
3
ships were hroup-ht in. The Dutch fleet drew back into the har-
4 2
bors and refused to f i?Tht , though their ships were taken dail^ .
Van frogh remonstrated to tlie King, who said he had ordered it be-
cause it was understood De Ruyter had gone to Guinea to disturb
English shiX)s and trade, cOid he had seized as many as he coulu
5
be held till further, news from Be Ruyter.
De Witt, again in December, tried to secure the mediation of
6
France and hoped that a settlement might be made betv/een the two
nations. Louis XIV., through, his ambassador at London once more
7
offered mediation to the English Government, but his proposition
met v/ith the same reception as before.
An actual battle was fought between the English and Dutch
fleets in the Mediterranean, although war had not yet been de-
clared. In accordance with his instructions to seize Dutch men-
8
of-war or the Smyrna fleet, Captain Allin of the English
squadron gave chase to a Dutch fleet, December 13, but in the
9
darkness ran aground and lost two ships. On the 19th, he again
10
attacked a Dutch merchant fleet, sunk two and captured two ships.
December 6, Downing' s spy in De Witt's Junto informed him
1 Parliamentary History IV., 303-6.
2 Calendar of State Papers , Domestic 1664-5, 95.
3 Pepys TI. , 190.
4 Ibid, 189.
5 Brieven de J. De Witt, 411.
6 Ibid, 407.
7 Ibid, 410.
8 Calendar of State Papers ,Domestic 1664-5, 70.
9 Ibid, 106.
10 Ibid, 123.
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that orders were to "be sent to De Ruyter to pio to the Enf^liBh
colonies in America, when he had done all the damage he could on
the African coast. Decer-foer 22, 1664, the first news of De Ruy-
ter's devastation of "FlnfTlish property on the African coast reached
Euf^land.^ In TJecembei-, uneii, Europe had the first positive in-
formation that De Ruyter had actually gone to Guinea. The news
of De Ruyter 's actions and Enp;lish losses created frreat ir;difj;na-
cion in Eiic'iand. He had retaken not only all the forts captured
by Holmes, but had seized all English forts, ships and car^^oes
3
within his power. His expedition along the African coast dealt
a heavy blow to En^^iish commercial interests and seriously affect-
ed, as well, the financial interests of the King, Duke of York
and other influential Englishmen. Preparations for v/ar vjei ^ nas-
tened una uii^ Kxng resolved to have one hundred and thirty ships
4
before spring.
5
The French King was also offended when he learned that De
Ruyter had actually gone to Africa, for De V/itt had officially
6
denied these rumors. Louis XIV. v/as very desirous of keeping
out of the quarrel, and this seemed to furnish a good excuse.
The French Ambassador now began to speak more dubiously of what
7
the States General might expect from. Prance. He began to inves-
tigate the m.atter to see if it lay within the treaty which bound
France only in case England were the aggressor and the rupture
5
were over matters in Europe.
1 Lister's Clarendon III., 352.
2 Pepys II. , 193-4.
3 Calendar of State Papers >Colonial 1661-8, ^ 986.
4 PeiDvs, 199.
5 Historical Mss. Coramission, Heathcote, 174.
6 Lister's Clarendon III., 359.
7 Ibid, 358.
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January 9, 1665, ^^olmes, who "had returned froT" Vils African
expedition, was sent to the Tower. The "Putch may have hoped even
yet that their actions mlr'^-'t he justified in the lirht of "^''olmes ' 8
1
testlTTiony. His trial was mac^e a "r>ere rratter of Jest," and it
appeared ni -ir- to ^is hearers that he had done no hostility or
damap-e except when first provoked hy the "Hutch and for af^rres-
2
sions which he could not hut resent. .January 15, ^^^illiamson de-
clared that there v/as no p-round whatever for the false rumors
.that peace was intended, which were heine: circulated hy the
2
Ptutch.
The last hope of the Dutch was gone, and in "p'ehruary many
capers hec-an to put to sea with letters of marque aga'inst Eng-
3lish ships, while a fleet of twelve or thirteen ships set out
for the ^"est Indies to exploit English possessions there. Let-
ters of marque v/ere also sent to Cadiz and Italy. In Pehruary,
England issued special reprisals against the Dutch to Fir Edward
Turner, !=;peaker of the House, and (George Carew until they had
recovered the value of the Bona Aventura and Esperanza.'^ :^ehru-
ary 18, however, "Sandwich with a fleet of twenty-five ships, re-
turned from a cruise and could not meet with a Dutchman.
February 9, the Bill for the appropriation voted by Parlia-
ment was presented to the King for his assent. The King now
had plenty of money and a large fleet and pushed the war vigor-
ously. February 22, he ordered that a formal declaration of war
1 Pepys II. , 199.
2 Historical ^^ss. Commission, Heathcote, 174.
3 Ihid, 176.
4 Calendar of State "^apers, Domestic 1664-5, 231.
5 ""epys II.
,
212-.
6 Parliamentary History rr. , 307.
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against the Dutch should be drawn up. Thio declaration waa ap-
proved by twenty- two of the Privy Councillors, but Clarendon and
1
Southampton refused to take ciny part in it, March 4, 1665, a
formal declaration of war was proclaimed in London "amidst the
2
shouting and rejoicing of the people."
CONCLUSION
A survey of this oeriod shows that the war of 1665-7 was a
commercial conflict between the two nations, one seeking to gain,
the other to maintain the supremacy of the sea. The beginnings of
this conflict may be seen when England formulated the commercial
policy expressed in the Navigation Acts of 1651 and '60. She
first attempted to maintain a monopoly of al 1 the commerce of
England and her colonies. The attempt to realize this policy
and the persistent evasion of the law by the Dutch resulted in
conflicts and losses which produced a strong national antagonism
between the two countries.
During the years 1661-2, England went a step farther and at-
tempted to secure a monopoly of Portuguese trade in t>ie East In-
dies and in Europe, She insisted that the Dutch should not be
given equal trading privileges with the English in Portuguese
dominions.
In 1663, she sought a still larger share of the world's com-
merce by vigorously developing her commercial interest^ on the
African coast, West Indies, and America. This persistent attempt
1 Parliamentary History IV., 308.
2 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1664-5, 242.
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of En^cland to monopolize more and more of the world's trade,
brought her into conflict with the Dutch in all parts of the world,
for they strongly resented the encroachment on their trade suprem-
acy.
The constant friction of the two peoples on the seas, final-
ly issued into actual warfare on the African coast, where the
trading interests of the Dutch v'est India and Royal African Com-
panies clashed. The losses of the merchants and trading compan-
ies were taken up by the mother countries and "became grievances
of state. These differences might easily have "been settled had
England so desired. Her aggressive and uncompromising attitude
prevented a settlement and war "became imminent.
In Holland, there was unanimous opposition to the war. Both
the government p.^^.d the people were strongly opposed to it. The
Province of Holland with difficulty equipped a fleet for the de-
fense of Dutch possessions and trade, hut could secure little
help from the other provinces.' The Dutch sought to avoid war hy
offering, to restrain their fleet if England would do the sam.e.
England insisted that the Dutch fleet should remain within the
harbors but refused to restrain her own. Holland then souo-ht to
settle the disputed questions of ships and trading posts which had
been seized ^:)y the subjects of both countries. England demanded
full restit-'tion for her ovm losses but refused to recoo-nize or
prom.ise satisfaction for those of' the Dutch.
Prance then offered to settle the questions of dispute. Hol-
land eagerly accepted mediation on these questions, v/hich could
not.be settled by the two nations involved. England refused it
twice. The "ostensible unsettled grounds of dispute" were trif-
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lln<^, but the real difficulty could "be settled only in a conflict,
in which superior Btren,^;;th and resources must decide the reBult.
It was not a question of settlement of differences "but of larp;er
trade for England.
In Enp;land public opinion was divided. The Governnent as
well as the nation wats divided on tlio question of war. The rad-
ical leaders of the English p:overninent , the Dulce of Yorl:, Coven-
try, Bennet, and IDownin^ assumed an a^^gresaive attitude for the
increase of English trade and were uncompromising in their nego-
tiations with the Dutch. There were powerful men in the Court
strongly opposed to a war with Holland, but the war 'oarty carried
Parliainent , the Court, and the King and repelled all overtures of
the Dutch for peace. It is quite probable that personal interests
and financial losses influenced the leaders of this movement in
their attitude toward the Dutch. The war party quite probably
represented the sentiments and public opinion of London but not
of the nation, which was opposed to a war with Holland. Thus,
England was dra\vn into a war with the Dutch by an aggressive min-
ority for the increase of English trade and humiliation of Holland.
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